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BANKRUPTCY-DoEs BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION 106 Au­
THORIZE A WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS CLAIMS? 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a lower-middle-class taxpayer and you 
have finally realized your lifelong dream of starting your own busi­
ness.l After years of having to punch someone else's clock, you are 
finally ready to hang up your own shingle. You hope that the joy 
felt during the ribbon-cutting ceremony is a sign of a long and pros­
perous financial future. Unfortunately, your business does not 
prosper. There are simply no customers to be found. On the other 
hand, you have no trouble attracting the attention of your creditors. 
It seems as though past-due notices are now arriving hourly. After 
weeks of avoiding the inevitable, your bookkeeper says the words 
you have been dreading: "You're bankrupt." The words hit you 
with force, as though you have been told that you are dying.2 
All is not lost, however. Your bookkeeper explains the bank­
ruptcy process to you. The modern bankruptcy system, you are 
told, is more about reconciliation than about punishing someone 
who cannot make good on his or her debts.3 By submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, you will be offered the chance 
for a fresh financial start. 4 More importantly, once you file for 
bankruptcy, the court will issue a discharge injunction, which elimi­
nates certain debts and prevents further attempts to collect on 
them.s Having spent the last few weeks dreading the telephone 
calls of increasingly impatient creditors, you decide to file for 
bankruptcy. 
1. The following hypothetical incorporates elements from Atkins v. United States 
(In re Atkins), 279 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002), and Matthews v. United States (In 
re Matthews), 184 B.R. 594 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1995). 
2. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS-BANKRUPTCY 
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 3 (1989) ("Bankrupt .... The single word is a 
body blow, like '[d]ead."'). 
3. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (4th ed. 2006). 
4. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
5. 11 U.S.c. § 524 (2000 & Supp. 2006). See generally U.S. Courts, The Discharge 
in Bankruptcy, http://www.uscourts.govlbankruptcycourtslbankruptcybasics/discharge. 
html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007). 
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Then, shortly after the discharge takes effect, you start receiv­
ing past due notices again. You are surprised because the debts to 
which these notices refer supposedly were discharged. At first, you 
assume these are mere administrative oversights and ignore them. 
When they keep coming, you write to the creditor and explain that 
the debt in question was discharged. In response you receive a no­
tice threatening you with criminal sanctions. As the phone calls and 
demand letters increase, you begin to feel depressed. It seems as 
though you will never escape your debts. You hoped that filing for 
bankruptcy would put a stop to sleepless nights, but they have re­
turned with force. The worry is beginning to make you physically 
ill. Your spouse and children are also troubled by the situation. Fi­
nally, you receive a notice from the creditor: "After careful consid­
eration, cancellation of the balance remaining on your debt has 
been approved." 
Can you sue the creditor for the emotional distress that its ac­
tions have caused? The answer should be yes, if you can also prove 
the requisite causation. Overzealous bill collectors have been held 
liable for emotional distress in the past.6 However, the answer to 
this question now lies in another question, who was the creditor? 
In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, despite case 
law to the contrary,7 that the Bankruptcy Code contains no waiver 
of sovereign immunity for claims of emotional distress.8 Thus, 
debtors who have been emotionally harmed by government credi­
tors cannot be compensated for their emotional distress. 
This Note will discuss the application of the Bankruptcy Code's 
sovereign immunity waiver to claims of emotional distress caused 
by the government's violations of a discharge injunction. Part I will 
provide background information on the concept of sovereign immu­
nity. Part II will discuss the history of the Bankruptcy Code in gen­
eral, with specific emphasis placed on the discharge injunction,9 the 
6. E.g., Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 91 S.E.2d 383, 385-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956) 
(holding debt collector liable for frightening a child of debtor during attempted repos­
session of a television set); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 345 N.E.2d 37, 38-39 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1976) (holding a collector liable who made multiple, disparaging phone calls to 
debtor). 
7. Atkins v. United States (In re Atkins), 279 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Matthews v. United States (In re Matthews), 184 B.R. 594, 595 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1995); 
see also First Impressions, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 459, 463-64 (2006) (listing In re 
Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005), as a case of first impression). 
8. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 31. 
9. 11 U.S.c. § 524 (2000). 
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waiver of sovereign immunity,lO and the bankruptcy court's en­
forcement powers.ll Part III will provide a brief case history of 
emotional distress claims brought against the government for viola­
tion of a discharge injunction, with specific emphasis on the recent 
case In re Rivera Torres .12 Part IV will discuss the various types of 
damages and how they are classified. Finally, Part V will reexamine 
the Rivera Torres decision and conclude that the Bankruptcy 
Code's sovereign immunity waiver should extend to emotional dis­
tress claims. 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND 

ITS INTERPRETATION13 

Sovereign immunity is the doctrine under which a sovereign 
government is immune from suit absent specific legislative authori­
zation to the contrary.14 The federal right to sovereign immunity is 
not derived from any specific statute or constitutional provision, but 
is "so firmly entrenched as to be substantially beyond question in 
10. 11 U.S.c. § 106. 
11. 11 U.S.c. § 105 (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
12. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20. 
13. For the purposes of this Note, waivers of sovereign immunity will refer only to 
the abrogation of federal sovereign immunity. State sovereign immunity is derived 
from the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ("The 
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Jeffrey K. O'Connor, 
Note, Is It the Officer or the Gentleman?: Issues of Capacity in § 1983 Actions Brought 
in Federal Court, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 327 (2006) (stating that the Eleventh 
Amendment is the "textual reflection" of the sovereign immunity doctrine). Prior to 
2006, there was much debate over the constitutionality of Congress's abrogation of the 
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. However, in Central Virginia 
Community College v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that abrogation of sovereign 
immunity was unnecessary in bankruptcy proceedings against state governments 
because the ability of the federal government to subject states to jurisdiction is within 
the federal government's constitutional powers to administer bankruptcy law. Cent. Va. 
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) ("The relevant question is not whether 
Congress has 'abrogated' States' immunity in proceedings to recover preferential 
transfers.... The question, rather, is whether Congress' determination that States 
should be amenable to such proceedings is within the scope of its power to enact 'Laws 
on the subject of Bankruptcies.' We think it beyond peradventure that it is." (citation 
omitted». See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9I 106.02 (14th ed. 2006) 
(describing in detail the history of the debate over federal abrogation of sovereign 
immunity); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic 
Village: Amended Section 106 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 341-47 
(1995). 
14. Joseph D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immu­
nity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060 (1946). 
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the federal courts. "15 Formally recognized for the first time in 
1821,16 the doctrine has since been described as predating, and thus 
impliedly incorporated in, the ConstitutionP This Part will look 
first at the rationales given for the doctrine's existence and will then 
discuss the various interpretations the courts have given to the 
doctrine. 
A. Reasons and Rationales for Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign immunity has its origins in the English common law 
concept that" 'the King can do no wrong.' "18 Modern legal schol­
ars consider this primary rationale an anachronism in a government 
purported to be based on law and not on men.19 Today, sovereign 
immunity is a somewhat controversial concept, with a majority of 
legal scholars rejecting the doctrine.20 As a result, several different 
rationales exist for the modern application of the doctrine. 
15. David A. Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity: 5 U.S.C. § 702 Spells 
Relief, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 725, 726 (1988). But cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 811 
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is much irony in the Court's profession that it 
grounds its opinion on a deeply rooted historical tradition of sovereign immunity, when 
the Court abandons a principle nearly as inveterate, and much closer to the hearts of 
the Framers: that where there is a right, there must be a remedy."). 
16. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821). 
17. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("[T]he States' immunity from suit is a fundamental 
aspect of the sovereignty which the States' enjoyed before the ratification of the Consti­
tution, and which they retain today."). 
18. Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Maysonet­
Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 54 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Gov­
ernmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1,2 (1924) (arguing that sovereign immunity's 
English development was based on misconceptions of early law and practice). 
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 12 (2004) 
("Sovereign Immunity is inconsistent with a central maxim of American government: 
that no one, not even the government, is above the law."); William A. Fletcher, A His­
toricalInterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirm­
ative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 1033, 1040-41 (1983); John E. H. Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No 
Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States 
and New York Court of Claims, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 39,56-57 (1969); Carlos Manuel 
Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685-86 (1997) 
("The Eleventh Amendment has long been regarded as an embarrassment to the 
United States's [sic] aspirations to be a government of laws and not of men."); Webster, 
supra note 15, at 727; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 405-06 ("We must ascribe 
the [Eleventh A]mendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State."). 
20. John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear State­
ment Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 775 (1995); see also United States v. Hom, 29 F.3d 
754, 762 n.7 (1st Cir. 1994) ("For its part, the scholarly community has been overwhelm­
ingly hostile to the doctrine."). But see David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Semi­
nole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1997) (arguing that sovereign immunity is 
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A second rationale that has been discarded by modern theo­
rists is that courts are unable to entertain suits against the govern­
ment because they have no enforcement power over the 
executive.21 A more modern approach to this rationale roots sover­
eign immunity in the doctrine of constitutional separation of pow­
ers.22 Sovereign immunity, it is argued, protects the elected 
branches of government from incursion by the unelected federal 
jUdiciary.23 
The more prominent theory of sovereign immunity is based on 
governmental efficiency.24 Suits by individual citizens against the 
government interfere with the performance of the government and 
serve as a potential drain on resources that should be used for the 
benefit of all citizens.25 Thus, sovereign immunity protects the 
common good by "forcing individuals to bear their own losses suf­
fered at the hands of government. "26 
B. Interpreting Sovereign Immunity Waivers 
Where the government wishes to waive its immunity, it does so 
by passing a specific statutory waiver.27 Courts interpreting waivers 
of sovereign immunity employ either a strict or a liberal construc­
constitutionally sound); Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 1529 (1992) (offering a defense of sovereign immunity). 
21. Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570-71 (1962) (allowing the court to 
hear the suit despite its reliance on other branches for enforcement powers); Roger C. 
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory 
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 387, 397 (1970); Webster, supra note 15, at 727 (noting the rejection of 
this theory). For an example of the application of this rationale, see Kawananakoa v. 
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("[T]here can be no legal right as against the au­
thority that makes the law on which the right depends."). 
22. Webster, supra note 15, at 727. The separation of powers refers to the system 
whereby power is delegated between the three branches of government so that no one 
branch can control the other two. See generally U.S. Constitution Online, Constitu­
tional Topic: Separation of Powers, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_sepp.html 
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007) (describing the concept of separation of powers in the 
United States, as well as in several other nations). 
23. Webster, supra note 15, at 727. 
24. Id. 
25. Block, supra note 14, at 1062; Webster, supra note 15, at 727; see also United 
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882). 
26. Webster, supra note 15, at 727. However, this theory becomes increasingly 
less plausible as more waivers of government immunity are granted. Id. at 727 n.18. 
27. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 6 (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 
2671-2680 (2000) (waiving immunity against torts committed by government employees 
while acting on behalf of the government); id. § 1491 (waiving sovereign immunity in 
cases involving government contracts). 
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tion to that waiver.28 Courts that apply a strict construction to sov­
ereign immunity waivers assign narrow meanings to statutory 
terms.29 These courts require that a waiver of sovereign immunity 
be unequivocally expressed in order to be valid.30 Thus, waivers are 
construed in the narrowest sense.31 Further, any conditions placed 
on a waiver are observed in the strictest sense with no implied ex­
ceptions.32 These courts hesitate to impose monetary claims against 
the government, regardless of an explicit waiver of sovereign immu­
nity or of a statute's remedial nature.33 In its most extreme form, 
this approach eliminates all forms of extrinsic evidence, relying 
solely on the text of the statute itself to determine the scope of the 
waiver.34 
Alternatively, courts applying a liberal interpretation to waiv­
ers of sovereign immunity interpret statutory terms expansively.35 
28. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 778. 
29. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY IN­
TERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 55 (2002) ("Strict statute inter­
pretation is assigning narrow meaning to words. "). 
30. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999); Lane v. Pena, 
518 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1996); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990). 
31. E.g., Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 601-02 (2005) ("[A] waiver of sover­
eign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign."); see also U.S. 
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 622-23 (1992) (applying the more restrictive 
interpretation and holding that a waiver for "coercive" fines does not imply a waiver for 
"punitive" fines). 
32. E.g., Irwin, 498 U.S. at 97 (White, J., concurring) ("[C)onditions on the Gov­
ernment's waiver of sovereign immunity ... must be 'strictly observed and exceptions 
thereto are not to be implied.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 
U.S. 156, 161 (1981»). 
33. Nagle, supra note 20, at 778-79. Statutes are considered remedial if they 
"provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforce­
ment of rights and the redress of injuries." 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STAT­
UTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60:2 (6th ed. 2006); see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, 
at 60 ("A remedial statute is one intended to fix an existing problem rather than, for 
example, a taxing or revenue raising statute."). 
34. Nagle, supra note 20, at 772. For example, in several key cases, the Court 
refused to consider the purpose of a statute in deciding whether the statute waived 
sovereign immunity. E.g., United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) ("If 
clarity does not exist [in the statute], it cannot be supplied by a committee report."). 
We have no doubt that the broad purposes of the EAJA would be served by 
making the statute applicable to deportation proceedings .... But we cannot 
extend the EAJA to administrative deportation proceedings when the plain 
language of the statute, coupled with the strict construction of waivers of sov­
ereign immunity, constrain us to do otherwise. 
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991). 
35. Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) ("[S]uch waivers by Con­
gress of governmental immunity ... should be liberally construed."); see also BROWN & 
BROWN, supra note 29, at 55 ("A liberal interpretation is the reverse [of strict interpre­
tation]: words are expansively interpreted. "). 
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These courts are more likely to characterize the concept of sover­
eign immunity as disfavored.36 Rather than assuming that sover­
eign immunity was retained unless specifically waived, these courts 
assume that sovereign immunity has been waived unless specifically 
retained.37 Courts that interpret sovereign immunity liberally have 
become increasingly less common.38 Many courts now take the 
more neutral approach of using legislative history to determine 
whether Congress intended to waive immunity in the situation at 
bar.39 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
Punishing defaulting debtors was the primary goal of the 
world's first bankruptcy statutes.40 In fact, the term "bankruptcy" 
is said to derive from the medieval practice of breaking the bench 
of a banker or tradesman who could not repay his debts.41 The first 
English bankruptcy statute, passed in 1543, retained this penal tone 
by providing for the imprisonment of defaulting debtors.42 The 
evolution of American bankruptcy law, however, demonstrates an 
increasing emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment.43 
36. Nagle, supra note 20, at 779; see, e.g., Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co., 
153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The exemption of the sovereign from 
suit involves hardship enough where the consent has been withheld. We are not to add 
to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced."). 
37. Burr, 309 U.S. at 245; Nagle, supra note 20, at 779. 
38. Nagle, supra note 20, at 779-80. But see United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 
622 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Its persistence cannot be denied but ought not to 
be celebrated. Nor should its fictive origin ever be forgotten."); Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520 (1984) (liberally construing a sue-and-be-sued 
clause). Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens is a prominent modern critic of sov­
ereign immunity. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121, 
1129 (1993) ("[T]he legitimate interests served by the ancient doctrine of immunity can 
be better protected by legislative rules, or even judge-made rules, that are responsive to 
those specific concerns rather than by an archaic blunderbuss."). 
39. Nagle, supra note 20, at 780. 
40. BAIRD, supra note 3, at 4; Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Remedying Violations of the 
Discharge Injunction Under Bankruptcy Code § 524, Federal Non-Bankruptcy Law, and 
State Law Comports with Congressional Intent, Federalism, and Supreme Court Jurispru­
dence for Identifying the Existence ofan Implied Right ofAction, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 77, 
91-93 (2003) (describing the evolution of bankruptcy law from Roman law to the mod­
ern U.S. Bankruptcy Code). 
41. Wasson, supra note 40, at 91. Another translation indicates that the debtor's 
entire business was destroyed. Id. at 91 n.37. 
42. Id. at 92. 
43. See id. at 94-96; see also STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CASES & MATERIALS ON 
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTIONS 457-58 (4th ed. 1987). 
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A. 	 The Evolution of Bankruptcy and the Discharge in the United 
States 
The United States' first bankruptcy statute was passed in 
1800.44 The statute was characterized as "stringent" for requiring 
two-thirds of creditors to consent before a discharge was ordered.45 
Opposition from creditors led to its repeal in 1803.46 The second 
statute,47 active for only eighteen months, featured a liberalized 
right to a discharge for all persons unless a majority of creditors 
filed a written dissent.48 The third statute,49 passed in 1867 and re­
pealed in 1878, further liberalized the scope of eligibility and al­
lowed corporations to seek bankruptcy protection.50 Although the 
previous statutes were generally short-lived, the fourth federal 
bankruptcy act51 is notable for its longevity. 52 Passed in 1898, this 
Act remained in effect, albeit subject to a near complete revision,53 
until it was replaced by the modern bankruptcy code in 1978.54 
B. 	 Section 524: The Effect of a Discharge Injunction 
When a petition for bankruptcy is filed, most of the petitioner's 
debts are automatically discharged, subject to several statutory ex­
ceptions.55 Section 524 codifies the injunctive effect of the dis­
charge order.56 The discharge injunction not only prevents 
creditors from filing suit to recover discharged debts, but it also pre­
vents many other collection actions, such as telephone calls, letters, 
and personal contacts, intended to bring about repayment.57 When 
44. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
45. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 457 n.20. 
46. Id. at 457. 
47. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1842). 
48. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 457, 457 n.23. 
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176,14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). 
50. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 457. 
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
52. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 458; Wasson, supra note 40, at 95. 
53. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). 
54. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.c.); Wasson, supra note 40, at 95. 
55. u.S. Courts, supra note 5. Which debts will be discharged depends mostly on 
the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code under which the petitioner files. Id.; see also id. 
§ 727 (2000) (chapter 7 liquidation); id. § 944 (municipal debtors); id. § 1141 (chapter 
11); id. § 1228 (family farmers); id. § 1328 (chapter 13 reorganization). Regardless of 
the chapter, section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code contains a broad listing of debts not 
subject to the discharge. Id. § 523(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
56. 11 U.S.c. § 524(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006). 
57. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY n 524.01-.02[2] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 
15th ed. 2006). 
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faced with a creditor's violation of a discharge injunction, most 
bankruptcy courts will order actual damages, attorneys' fees, and, 
where appropriate, punitive damages.58 
Historically, the term "discharge" referred to both the release 
of debts and the release of the debtor from prison.59 Under the 
present bankruptcy system, the discharge is viewed almost exclu­
sively as a rehabilitative tool.60 For bankruptcy filers consumed by 
debt, a discharge order is "financial death and financial rebirth."61 
The order and the injunction it creates against collection activities 
grant the debtor a fresh start.62 For creditors, the discharge 
presents little hardship since the debtor's bankruptcy indicates the 
minimal probability that the debt would have been repaid.63 For 
these reasons, the discharge, with its injunctive function, is viewed 
as a debtor's most important benefit.64 
C. Section 106: A Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
When a government creditor violates the discharge injunction, 
the normal rules of the discharge injunction must be viewed 
through the prism of § 106, which operates as a waiver of sovereign 
immunity for several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.65 In a ba­
sic sense, the purpose of § 106 is to treat the government in nearly 
the same manner as private creditors for the purposes of bank­
ruptcy proceedings.66 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained no 
58. Bessette v. Avco Fin. Serv., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000); In re Perviz, 302 
B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003). 
59. Cent. Va. Cmty. ColI. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006) ("Indeed, the earliest 
English statutes governing bankruptcy and insolvency authorized discharges of persons, 
not debts."). See generally John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important Devel­
opment in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 165-85 (1996) (describing and 
interpreting the original British discharge statutes). 
60. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUITCY LAW 225 
(1986); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 ("When a judge signs a paper titled 'Dis­
charge,' debts legally disappear."); McCoid, supra note 59, at 192 ("Seen in historical 
context, the discharge was the ultimate instrument of the transformation of bankruptcy 
from a creditors' collection remedy to a system of statutorily mandated composition 
mutually beneficial to debtors and creditors."). 
61. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4. 
62. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli., 546 U.S. at 364 ("[T]he ultimate discharge ... gives the 
debtor a 'fresh start' by releasing him, her, or it from further liability for old debts."); 
JACKSON, supra note 60, at 225. 
63. BAIRD, supra note 3, at 35. 
64. Wasson, supra note 40, at 95. 
65. 11 U.S.c. § 106 (2000). 
66. Gibson, supra note 13, at 311. 
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explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.67 The result was a one-sided 
system: the government could act as a creditor in bankruptcy pro­
ceedings, forcing the debtor to litigate any claims it had against the 
government in a completely separate forum.68 The original version 
of § 10669 included a waiver of sovereign immunity "with respect to 
any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the 
estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrences out 
of which such governmental unit's claim arose."70 Further, the stat­
ute required that a judicial determination would be binding upon 
governmental units.71 
Questions of interpretation arose almost immediately follow­
ing the passage of this section, particularly in regard to the reconcil­
iation of the rather limited waivers in subsections (a) and (b) with 
the seemingly broad waiver in subsection (C)J2 Specifically, ques­
tions arose as to whether the section authorized monetary recovery 
against the governmenU3 Two Supreme Court decisions made it 
clear that § 106 required redrafting.74 
67. 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, <J[ 106.04. 
68. S. REp. No. 95-989, at 30 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815 
("The governmental unit cannot receive a distribution from the estate without subject­
ing itself to any liability it has to the estate within the confines of a compulsory counter­
claim rule. Any other result would be one-sided."); Richard A. Greene, Comment, 
Waivering in the Sight of an Adversary, Bankruptcy Code Section 106 and the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 531, 538 (2002). 
69. 11 U.S.c. § 106 (1978) (amended 1994), as reprinted in 2 COLLIER, supra note 
13, <J[ 106.LH[1]. The original version of § 106 reads: 
(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity 
with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of 
the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrences out of 
which such governmental unit's claim arose. 
(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a govern­
mental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the 
estate. 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and not 
withstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity­
(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor," "entity," or "gov­
ernmental unit" applies to governmental units; and 
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a pro­
vision binds governmental units. 
Id. 
70. Id. § 106(a). 
71. Id. § 106(c)(2). 
72. Gibson, supra note 13, at 316. This ambiguity may have been a result of a 
compromise over the scope of differing versions of the initial bill. See id. at 313-16. 
73. Greene, supra note 68, at 539. 
74. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 
3350-51. 
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In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Mainte­
nance,75 the Court held that the language of § 106(c) referred only 
to declaratory and injunctive relief and not to monetary recovery.76 
The Court reasoned that the statute's use of the term "determina­
tions" rather than "claims" or "rights of payment," led to the con­
clusion that the statute did not authorize monetary recovery from 
the states.77 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc. ,78 decided three 
years later, applied the same basic logic to claims against the federal 
government.79 As a result of these decisions, a debtor could only 
receive monetary damages from the government for Bankruptcy 
Code violations by filing a counterclaim to a preexisting govern­
ment suit.80 If the government did not file a suit, the debtor had no 
standing.81 In the years following these decisions, bankruptcy 
courts struggled to fulfill the strict requirements imposed by Hoff­
man and Nordic Village.82 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended § 106 to specifi­
cally include monetary relief in an action against the government.83 
More importantly, the amended § 10684 was intended specifically to 
75. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989). 
76. Id. at 102. See infra Part IV for a discussion of damage classifications. 
77. Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 102; see also supra note 13 (discussing the distinction 
between waivers of federal and state sovereign immunity). 
78. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992). 
79. Id. at 33-37. 
80. Greene, supra note 68, at 540. 
81. Nichols v. IRS (In re Nichols), 143 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) 
("Multiple and egregious violations ... go uncompensated merely because the IRS is 
the violator, and it has not filed a proof of claim."). 
82. Gibson, supra note 13, at 321-22; Nagle, supra note 20, at 796; see, e.g., Nich­
ols, 143 B.R. at 108 (noting, with frustration, the binding effect of Nordic Village). 
83. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.c.). 
84. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). The amended version of § 106 reads: 
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immu­
nity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this sec­
tion with respect to the following: 
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 
503,505,506,510,522,523,524,525,542,543,544,545,546,547,548,549,550, 
551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944, 
1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303, 
1305, and 1327 of this title. 
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect 
to the application of such sections to governmental units. 
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, pro­
cess, or judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pro­
cedure, including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not 
including an award of punitive damages. Such order or judgment for costs or 
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overrule the holdings in Hoffman and Nordic Village. 85 The section 
by section committee report makes specific reference to both cases 
before stating: 
This amendment expressly provides for a waiver of sovereign im­
munity by governmental units with respect to monetary recov­
eries as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. It is the 
Committee's intent to make section 106 conform to the Congres­
sional intent of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 waiving the 
sovereign immunity of the States and the Federal Government in 
this regard.86 
The net effect of the amendment: was to omit the ambiguous 
subsection (c) and replace it with a new, more specific subsection 
(a).87 The new subsection (a) specifically lists sixty sections of the 
Code, including § 524, where the government has explicitly waived 
sovereign immunity.88 Subsection (a)(3), in a strong rebuke of both 
Hoffman and Nordic Village, allows the bankruptcy courts to issue 
"an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not includ­
ing an award of punitive damages. "89 
With the passage of the 1994 amendments, Congress hoped 
that the language would clarify the concerns expressed in Hoffman 
and Nordic Village.90 As Representative Berman stated: 
fees under this title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any 
governmental unit shall be consistent with the provisions and limitations of 
section 2412( d)(2)(A) of title 28. 
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment against 
any governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law 
applicable to such governmental unit and, in the case of a money judgment 
against the United States, shall be paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a 
district court of the United States. 
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief 
or cause of action not otherwise existing under this title, the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law. 
Id. 
85. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 
3350-51. 
86. Id. 
87. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 § 113. 
88. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(I). Notably absent from the list of waived sections is 
§ 541. This was done to prevent a debtor from bringing tort claims completely unre­
lated to bankruptcy in the bankruptcy courts. 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 'lI 106.05[1]; 
Greene, supra note 68, at 540-41. Also included is § 728, which related to special tax 
provisions. Although repealed in 2005, the reference to § 728 remains within the text of 
§ 106(a)(I). See Bankruptcy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.c.). 
89. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
90. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42. 
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First, I am very pleased by the inclusion of Section 113 in the bill, 
effectively overruling the decisions of the Supreme Court in U.S. 
versus Nordic Village and Hoffman versus Connecticut Depart­
ment of Income Maintenance, and clarifying the original intent of 
Congress in enacting Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code with 
regard to sovereign immunity.91 
However, while the rewritten subsection put to rest the concerns 
over whether there was a waiver of sovereign immunity at all, at 
least one commentator noted that new concerns would arise over 
the scope of that waiver.92 
C. Section 105: The Bankruptcy Court's Enforcement Powers 
Section 105, the Bankruptcy Code's enforcement provision, al­
lows bankruptcy courts to make "any order, process, or judgment 
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this 
title."93 In attempting to construe this grant of authority, most 
courts see § 105 as a broad grant of authority to implement the ex­
press and implied goals of the Bankruptcy Code by filling in the 
gaps left by the statutory language.94 However, some have argued 
for the application of a more narrow construction.95 There is gen­
eral agreement that a bankruptcy court does not have the power to 
fix every problem a debtor brings to it.96 
91. 140 CONGo REC. 27,699 (1994) (emphasis added). 
92. Gibson, supra note 13, at 329. 
93. 11 U.S.c. § 105(a). 

The court may issue any order; process, or judgment that is necessary or ap­

propriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title 

providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to 

preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determi­

nation necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, 

or to prevent an abuse of process. 

Id. 
94. E.g., United States V. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545,549 (1990) ("These stat­
utory directives are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy 
courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relation­
ships."); 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 'lI 105.01[2] ("Bankruptcy courts, both through their 
inherent powers as courts and through the general grant of power in section 105, are 
able to police their dockets and afford appropriate relief. "). 
95. See Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy 
Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 
25-50 (2005) (arguing that the characterization of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity 
is incorrect). 
96. E.g., GAF Corp. V. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26 
B.R. 405, 409-10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (,"Section 105 is not without limits. It does 
not permit the court to ignore, supersede, suspend or even misconstrue the statute itself 
or the rules.''' (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY'll 105.02 (15th ed. 1982»), affd, 40 
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The legislative history of § 105 demonstrates a gradual broad­
ening of the powers of the bankruptcy courts.97 The predecessor to 
the modern § 105 provided that a bankruptcy court's order must be 
"necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. "98 
The 1978 enactment of the new language, allowing the bankruptcy 
court to also issue orders "appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title," is characterized as evidence that Congress intended 
bankruptcy courts to deal with all aspects of a bankruptcy proceed­
ing.99 Subsequent amendments have consistently broadened the 
bankruptcy court's power by giving judges a greater ability to im­
prove docket and case management. lOO 
III. CASE LAW: SUING THE IRS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
Prior to 2005, only two reported cases involved the recovery of 
emotional distress damages against the government for violations of 
the discharge injunction,lol These cases contain little substantive 
discussion of sovereign immunity.lo2 For this reason, In re Rivera 
Torres was considered a case of first impression, as it was the only 
case to examine the issue of sovereign immunity itself.lo3 
A. The Absence of Issue: The Bankruptcy Courts 
Following the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, only 
two cases arose in which the government was held liable to a tax­
payer for emotional distress as a result of violating a discharge in-
B.R. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 9I 105.01[2] ("[T]he power 
granted to the bankruptcy courts under section 105 is not boundless and should not be 
employed as a panacea for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy case."). 
97. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 9I 105.LH. 
98. 11 U.S.c. § 11(a)(15) (repealed 1978), as reprinted in 2 COLLIER, supra note 
13, 9I 105.LH. 
99. In re James, 20 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (" 'The basic intention 
of the section is to enable the bankruptcy court to do whatever is necessary to aid its 
jurisdiction, i.e., anything arising in or relating to a bankruptcy case.''' (quoting 2 COL. 
LlER ON BANKRUPTCY 9I 105.04 (15th ed. 1982». 
100. See Bankruptcy Judge, United States Trustee, and Family Farmers Bank­
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, tit. I, § 203, 100 Stat 3088, 3097 (adding the 
second sentence to § 105(a» (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S. C.); 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4108-09 
(adding § 105(d), which allows the court to schedule status conferences) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.c.). 
101. Atkins v. United States (In re Atkins), 279 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Matthews v. United States (In re Matthews), 184 B.R 594 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1995). 
102. Atkins, 279 B.R 639; Matthews, 184 B.R. 594. 
103. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005); First Impressions, supra note 
7, at 463-64 (listing Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, as a case of first impression). 
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junction.104 In re Matthews held, without any discussion, that the 
government was liable for the plaintiff's claims of mental 
anguish.!Os The government in Matthews objected only to the 
plaintiff's claim of punitive damages, because these damages were 
expressly prohibited by the statute.106 The only discussion on the 
matter of remedies involved calculating an appropriate measure of 
the plaintiff's injury.l07 
Bankruptcy Judge Littlefield described the facts of In re Atkins 
as "a portrait of a large bureaucracy running amuck."!08 Judge 
Littlefield made clear his contempt for the government's "fourteen 
years of ongoing 'torture'" of the debtor .109 He was not alone: The 
government's counsel was quoted in the opinion as saying, "There 
was no question that the Government was wrong," and conceding 
"the interest of the client right now is just to have the court award 
an amount. "110 Despite the dramatic fact pattern, Atkins sheds no 
more light on the waiver of sovereign immunity than did Matthews. 
B. Taking Issue: The Court of Appeals 
The lawsuit of Rivera Torres resulted from a typo.11l During 
the processing of the debtors' 1995 tax return, an IRS technician 
entered the wrong codes into the IRS computer system.112 As a 
result, the debtors' tax refund was applied to a previously dis­
charged debt, causing collection activities for that debt to 
resume.113 
After unsuccessfully attempting to resolve the matter directly 
with the IRS, the debtors filed a motion for an order that the IRS 
show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating 
§ 524.114 In its order for partial summary judgment in favor of the 
debtors, the bankruptcy court held that "§ 106(a) abrogated sover­
104. Atkins, 279 B.R. 639; Matthews, 184 B.R. 594. 
105. Matthews, 184 B.R. at 600. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 600-01. 
108. Atkins, 279 B.R. at 645. Between 1988 and 2000, the debtor was subjected to 
continuous demand letters and telephone calls from the government, multiple reten­
tions of income tax returns, and a foreclosure action. Id. at 641-45. 
109. Id. at 645 (citation omitted). In fact, Judge Littlefield indicated that he 
would have awarded punitive damages if such damages were not denied by § 106(a)(3). 
Id. at 645-46. 
110. Id. at 645. 
111. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2005). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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eign immunity for monetary relief," which included emotional dis­
tress damages.115 When the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel upheld 
the award of emotional distress damages,116 the IRS appealed that 
decision to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.117 
The First Circuit began its analysis by articulating the prevail­
ing standard that a waiver of sovereign immunity "must be both 
'unequivocally expressed' "118 and "'strictly construed in favor of 
the sovereign.' "119 Responding to the question of scope, the court 
cited Lane v. Pena,120 which stated that "to sustain a claim that the 
Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver 
must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims."121 The court 
considered and ultimately rejected a broad reading of § 106(a)(3)'s 
"an order, process, or judgment" language.122 
1. The Background Law Argument 
In interpreting the waiver, the court first determined whether 
emotional distress damages were allowed in similar situations prior 
to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994.123 This approach, the court 
reasoned, would most accurately depict the intent of Congress 
when it drafted the 1994 amendments.124 Prior to the 1994 amend­
ments, only one circuit had considered whether § 524 allowed 
courts to issue awards based on emotional distress.125 In Burd v. 
Walters,126 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the 
bankruptcy courts' ability to issue awards for emotional distress 
115. Id. at 22. The bankruptcy court rejected a claim for punitive damages based 
on the wording of § 106 and rejected a claim for attorneys' fees and costs because the 
debtors had failed to seek them in administrative proceedings. Id. 
116. United States v. Rivera Torres (In re Rivera Torres), 309 B.R. 643, 652 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), rev'd, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005). 
117. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 22. 
118. Id. at 23-24 (quoting Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 
(1999». 
119. Id. at 24 (quoting Ortf v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 602 (2005». 
120. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). 
121. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 24 (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 192). 
122. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (2000». 
123. Id. at 27. The court ignored several cases from the Eleventh Circuit that had 
allowed emotional distress damages, stating that they were irrelevant because they were 
decided after the 1994 amendments. Id. at 27-28. The cases cited by the court are Jove 
Engineering, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Engineering), 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996), and 
Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1996). 
124. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 25-26; see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, 
at 147-54 (stating persuasiveness of post-passage actions is less helpful in proving legis­
lative intent than actions taken prior to passage). 
125. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 27. 
126. Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989). 
281 2007] BANKRUPTCY AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS 
damages, noting that, "no authority [was] offered to support the 
proposition that emotional distress is an appropriate item of dam­
ages for civil contempt, and we know of none. "127 The Rivera 
Torres court also cited McBride v. Coleman,l28 which held that be­
cause of problems regarding proof, emotional distress claims should 
not be allowed where the enforcement instrument is civil con­
tempt.J29 The court concluded, based on the absence of back­
ground law, that the enumerated sections failed to provide a clear 
waiver of sovereign immunity for emotional distress claims.130 
2. Defining "Money Recovery" 
Next, the court examined whether, as the debtors claimed, the 
term "money recovery" included an award for emotional distress 
damages.131 The court used Bowen v. Massachusetts as its prece­
dent.132 Bowen held that the term "money damages" in the Ad­
ministrative Procedure Act's sovereign immunity waiver133 referred 
only to specific relief such as compensatory damages.134 The court 
then analyzed the legislative history of § 106 for any evidence that 
"the clear intent of Congress in enacting § 106 was to overrule cases 
holding that no emotional distress damages were available."135 Ri­
vera Torres concluded by noting that the express purpose of amend­
ing § 106 was to overrule Hoffman and Nordic Village, neither of 
which included a claim for emotional distress.136 For these reasons, 
the court held that § 106 contained no "definite[] and unequivo­
127. Id. at 670 ("[N]o authority is offered to support the proposition that emo­
tional distress is an appropriate item of damages for civil contempt, and we know of 
none."). Since the case did not involve a federal government agency, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was not discussed. 
128. McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1992). 
129. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 27 (citing McBride, 955 F.2d at 577). 
130. Id. at 29. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988». 
133. 5 U.S.c. § 702 (2000) ("An action in a court of the United States seeking 
relief other than money damages ... shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied 
on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indis­
pensable party."). 
134. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895 ("Our cases have long recognized the distinction 
between an action at law for damages-which are intended to provide a victim with 
monetary compensation for an injury to his person, property, or reputation-and an 
equitable action for specific relief-which may include [restitution and injunctive 
relief]. "). 
135. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 30. 
136. Id. at 31. 
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cal[] waiver of sovereign immunity" for emotional distress 
claims.137 
IV. REVISITING DAMAGES 
The Rivera Torres court, in rejecting a waiver of sovereign im­
munity for emotional distress claims, held that "money recovery" as 
referenced in § 106 does not include claims for emotional dis­
tress.138 However, this distinction seems to run afoul of the plain 
language of the statute when one considers the way in which differ­
ent types of damages and damage claims are defined and 
characterized. 
The generic term "damages" is used both to describe the harm 
done to the plaintiff and his or her available legal remedy.139 Gen­
erally, remedies are placed into four separate categories based on 
purpose: "(1) [d]amages remedies, (2) [r]estitution[] remedies, (3) 
[c]oercive remedies such as injunctions, or (4) [d]eclaratory 
remedies. "140 
A damage remedy is a money award that focuses on "making 
good the plaintiff's losses."141 The goal of compensatory damages, 
also referred to as "actual damages," is to place the plaintiff in the 
same position he or she would have been in but for the defendant's 
wrong.142 Thus, the focus in compensatory damages is on the harm 
done to the plaintiff.143 Damages may be either specific, such as the 
return of stolen property, or substitutional, such as requiring the 
defendant to give the plaintiff the value of the damaged prop­
erty.144 Despite the emphasis on valuation, this category also in­
137. Id. A concurring opinion came to the same conclusion, but took issue with 
the use of legislative histories in the analysis. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., concurring). 
138. Id. at 31 (majority opinion). 
139. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 3 
n.14 (2d ed. 1993); 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01[1] 
(Mark Wasserman et al. eds., 2002). 
140. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 2; see also JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING 
REMEDIES 5-10 (2006); NORMAN JAY lTZKOFF, Introduction, in DEALING WITH DAM. 
AGES 1-6 (Norman Jay Itzkoff ed., 1983). Each type of damages was treated as a sepa­
rate body of law until they were brought together in 1955 by Charles Alan Wright's 
Cases on Remedies. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 2 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, REM­
EDIES (Erwin N. Griswold ed., 1955». 
141. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 3. 
142. 1 NATES, supra note 139, § 1.01[3]. 
143. See Turcotte v. De Witt, 131 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Mass. 1955) (" 'Damages' is the 
word which expresses in dollars and cents the injury sustained by a plaintiff."). 
144. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 209; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies 
for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149-60 (1970) (describing specific 
and substitution remedies). 
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cludes claims in which valuation is difficult or impossible, such as 
claims for pain and suffering and emotional distress.145 
The amount of a nominal damage award has no correlation to 
harm or IOSS.146 Nominal damages are typically sought when the 
plaintiff wishes to have an issue placed before the court but is una­
ble to prove specific damages.147 
Punitive damages, also referred to as exemplary damages, are 
those "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, 
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct 
and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the 
future."148 Traditionally, punitive damages were excluded from 
courts of equity "either because equity's sole province was to pro­
vide 'complete relief,' and compensatory damages marked the limit 
of that relief, or because punishment or vengeance seemed vaguely 
inappropriate to a 'benignant' equity."149 However, modern courts 
often reject this limitation.150 
Restitution remedies seek to prevent the unjust enrichment of 
the defendant.151 Although. both restitution and compensatory 
damages involve the return of money, restitution focuses only on 
the gain realized by the defendant and not on the harm or loss in­
curred by the plaintiff.152 Restitution has both legal and equitable 
145. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 211; 1 NATES, supra note 139, § 1.01[3]. 
146. [d. at 221. For this reason, they are described as "damages in name only." 
[d. 
147. [d. at 222. 
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965); see State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (citing punishment as a primary 
purpose); Wilhelm v. Ryan, 903 A.2d 745, 752 (Del. 2006) (citing both punishment and 
deterrence as purposes); Cabe v. Lunich, 640 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ohio 1994) (citing both 
punishment and deterrence as purposes). Deterrence may be specific, deterring the 
defendant from engaging in similar conduct, or general, aiming to set an example that 
will deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 2 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY & 
LITIGATION § 21:4 (J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl eds., 2d ed. 2002); Dan B. Dobbs, 
Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. 
REV. 831, 844-46 (1989). 
149. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 315 (citation omitted). 
150. E.g., I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 189 N.E.2d 812,813 (N.Y. 
1963) ("[This line of reasoning] presupposes a court intrinsically limited to granting 
remedies solely equitable in historical origin. There is no such court in this State."). 
151. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 4; see Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Signifi­
cance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1989). 
152. Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 
1063, 1066 (2003); see Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 742 (2006) 
(citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990». 
284 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:265 
origins, depending upon the type of restitution sought.153 For ex­
ample, an action for replevin154 has its roots in law while an action 
seeking a constructive trust155 has its roots in equity, yet both are 
considered to be remedies of restitution.156 
Injunctions act as a personal command by the court to the de­
fendant to either "act or avoid acting in a certain way."157 Injunc­
tions are also referred to as in personam orders or orders for 
specific performance.l58 Based in equity, a violation of an injunc­
tion is punishable by contempt of court.159 
Declaratory remedies seek to accurately interpret a party's 
rights.160 Declaratory judgments typically involve the court's deter­
mination of one party's rights in an ambiguous contract or the con­
stitutionality of a law or regulation.161 Jurisdictional bars against 
the issuance of advisory opinions often hamper the issuance of de­
claratory remedies.162 
All remedies serve to redress the wrong done to a party.163 
Remedies "developed both to complement substantive law and to 
meet the needs of litigants. "164 Because of the broad scope of rem­
edies and the diverse needs of litigants, it is essential that practition­
ers understand the different classifications of damages, their 
individual purposes, and the forms used to achieve those ends.165 
In the context of sovereign immunity waivers, understanding reme­
dies is all the more important because the waiver may be limited to 
certain categories of remedies.166 
153. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 9. See generally Thomas, supra note 152, at 1066­
68 (describing the distinctions between legal and equitable restitution). 
154. Replevin is "[a]n action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully 
taken or detained by the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds 
the property until the court decides who owns it." BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY 1325 
(8th ed. 2004). 
155. A constructive trust is "[a]n equitable remedy that a court imposes against 
one who has obtained property by wrongdoing. [It is] imposed to prevent unjust en­
richment ...." /d. at 1547. 
156. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 9. 
157. Id. at 5. 
158. Id. at 6. 
159. Id. at 5. 
160. Id. at 7; see BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY, supra note 154, at 859 (defining 
declaratory judgment as "[a] binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other 
legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement"). 
161. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 53. 
162. Id. at 7. 
163. FISCHER, supra note 140, at 2. 
164. Id. at 3. 
165. Id. 
166. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). 
285 2007] BANKRUPTCY AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS 
v. ANALYSIS: A SECOND LOOK AT IN RE RIVERA TORRES 
The remainder of this Note will argue that the In re Rivera 
Torres court was incorrect in denying emotional distress damages 
on the basis that sovereign immunity was not explicitly waived for 
such damages. First, this Part will argue that emotional distress 
claims are included in § 106 through the use of the term "money 
recovery."167 This Part will also argue that allowing this type of 
remedy is consistent with the legislative history of § 106. Further­
more, this Part will illustrate that allowing a waiver of sovereign 
immunity for emotional distress claims is consistent with the pur­
poses and policies of bankruptcy law in general. Finally, this Part 
will respond to the primary criticism of allowing emotional distress 
damages, arguing that this criticism is not a sound justification for 
precluding a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
A. Finding the Plain Meaning of "Money Recovery" 
The plain meaning doctrine is the most commonly stated rule 
of statutory interpretation today.168 The plain meaning doctrine as­
sumes that the legislature used the words, grammar, and punctua­
tion of a statute in a "normal" way to communicate its intent, 
therefore the words, grammar, and punctuation are given the mean­
ing that they would ordinarily produce.169 Ambiguous statutory 
terms lead to uncertainty in meaning and scope.11° Since the term 
"money recovery" in § 106 fails to clearly delineate the orders and 
judgments it properly includes, it is inherently vague. l71 To under­
stand this vague term, this Part begins where the Rivera Torres 
court began: § 106's legislative history.172 
167. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3) (2000). 
168. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 38. 
169. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). But see BROWN & 
BROWN, supra note 29, at 39 ("[W]hat may seem perfectly clear to one person may not 
be to another, particularly when the language produces an outcome that the person 
finds unacceptable."). 
170. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 
43-49 (1975). 
171. See id. at 49 ("Most words that denote classes or categories ... have ele­
ments of vagueness."). However, in certain situations, vagueness may be desirable 
(e.g., planning for unexpected contingencies and protecting against accidental omis­
sion). !d. 
172. Where statutory language is ambiguous, courts will look to the legislative 
history in order to ascertain congressional intent. United States v. Alky Enters., Inc., 
969 F.2d 1309, 1314 (1st CiT. 1992). This approach has been criticized as unreliable. 
United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 320 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(noting that legislative histories are often more vague than the statutes themselves); 
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1. Understanding Section 106's Legislative History 
In rejecting a waiver of sovereign immunity for emotional dis­
tress claims, the Rivera Torres court stated that emotional distress 
damages would only be allowed if the purpose of the 1994 amend­
ments were to overrule a case denying them.173 The court correctly 
concluded that the 1994 amendments sought to overrule the hold­
ings of Hoffman and Nordic Village.174 The court in Rivera Torres 
reasoned that because emotional distress damages were not in­
cluded in those cases, Congress did not intend for the 1994 amend­
ments to address those damages.175 However, the following Part 
demonstrates that Congress did in fact account for emotional dis­
tress claims by including language to support a waiver for compen­
satory damages. 
The 1994 amendments to § 106 evidence the congressional in­
tent that the waiver of sovereign immunity should be broadly inter­
preted. As the Rivera Torres court cites, the 1994 amendments 
were enacted specifically to overturn Hoffman and Nordic Vil­
lage.176 The purpose of the 1994 amendments was to clarify the 
confusion regarding the allowable remedies by making the waiver 
of sovereign immunity more explicit.177 Furthermore, these amend­
ments reject a strict interpretation of statutory waivers. The House 
Report on the 1994 amendments states that the intent of the origi­
nal § 106 was to subject both the states and the federal government 
to waivers of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.178 In 
order to make the statement "unmistakenly clear," the words, "in­
cluding an order awarding a money recovery" were added to the 
DICKERSON, supra note 170, at 155 ("[Legislative materials] are so heterogeneous and 
fragmentary and so influenced by the tactics of promoting enactment that they have 
almost no credibility for the purposes of later interpretation." (citation omitted»; see In 
re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with the majority's conclusion but taking issue with the use of legislative history to 
interpret the statute). See generally Steven Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth 
Lecture: On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 
845 (1992) (discussing the use of legislative histories in determining legislative intent, 
including examples of situations in which such use is especially helpful or 
inappropriate). 
173. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 30. 
174. Id. at 31. 
175. Id. at 30-31. 
176. Id. at 31; H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3350-51. 
177. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42. 
178. Id. 
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new version of the statuteP9 The congressional intent remained 
the same: In bankruptcy cases, government actors should be liable 
for compensatory damage awards. l80 
2. Reading the Statute in Remedy Terms 
The best method of understanding how the statute classifies 
damages is to look at its grammatical structure.181 Section 106 con­
tains three distinct clauses, each serving a vital role in the overall 
meaning of the statute. To best understand Congress's intent, one 
must examine the effect that each clause has on the section's overall 
structure. 
The first clause of the statute states: "The court may issue 
against a governmental unit an order, process, or judgment under 
such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. "182 If 
this clause was the only language in the statute, the bankruptcy 
court would be free to make any order or judgment possible, as this 
clause puts no restriction on the types of remedies available. The 
bankruptcy court would be empowered to issue injunctions and de­
claratory rulings, as well as order compensatory, restitution, and pu­
nitive damages. 
The language of the first clause of the amended statute is simi­
lar to the original version,183 which was held by the courts in Hoff­
179. See id. (noting that the construction used in Hoffman was "narrow"). 
180. See id. ("It is the Committee's intent to make section 106 conform to the 
Congressional intent of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 waiving the sovereign im­
munity of the States and the Federal Government in this regard."); see also 140 CONGo 
REC. 27,699 (1994) (statement of Rep. Berman). 
First, I am very pleased by the inclusion of Section 113 in the bill, effectively 
overruling the decisions of the Supreme Court in U.S. versus Nordic Village 
and Hoffman versus Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, and 
clarifying the original intent of Congress in enacting Section 106 of the Bank­
ruptcy Code with regard to sovereign immunity. 
Id. 
181. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) ("The 
language and punctuation Congress used cannot be read in any other way."). But see 
Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85, 91 (1925) ('''Punctuation is a minor, and not a control­
ling, element in interpretation, and courts will disregard the punctuation of a statute or 
re-punctuate it, if need be, to give effect to what otherwise appears to be its purpose 
and true meaning.'" (quoting Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Voelker, 129 F. 522, 527 (8th 
Cir. 1904))). 
182. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (2000). 
183. See 11 U.S.c. § 106(a) (1978) (amended 1994), as reprinted in 2 COLLIER, 
supra note 13, 'II 106.LH[1] ("A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign 
immunity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of 
the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrences out of which such 
governmental unit's claim arose."). 
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man and Nordic Village to allow only equitable remedies. l84 For 
this reason, Congress amended the section in 1994, effectively ad­
ding a second and third clause to the section.18S The second clause, 
"including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery," rein­
forces the bankruptcy courts' existing powers under the first 
clause.186 In effect, Congress was expressing its intent that the 
courts not be limited to mere injunctive and declaratory relief, but 
rather their powers of relief shall include the ability to award a 
"money recovery. "187 
By enacting the 1994 amendments to § 106, Congress over­
ruled Hoffman and Nordic Village, thus allowing a waiver of sover­
eign immunity for compensatory damages.188 For this reason, 
"money recovery" cannot be interpreted to include equitable reme­
dies, as the court would have retained such powers under the pre­
amendment version of § 106.189 Furthermore, interpreting "money 
recovery" to include only injunctive or declarative relief renders the 
second clause "mere surplusage," since the first clause covers all 
orders and judgments without restriction. Statutes must be read so 
that, if possible, "'no clause, sentence, or word becomes superflu­
ous, void, or insignificant.' "190 The legislative history demonstrates 
that the purpose of including the phrase "money recovery" in the 
statute was to make "unmistakenly clear" that the statute encom­
passed more than just declaratory and injunctive relief.191 To com­
pletely resolve the ambiguity in the term "money recovery" all 
three clauses of § 106 must be read together.192 This leaves as pos­
sibilities only compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legally 
based restitution. 
184. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-37 (1992); Hoffman v. 
Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 102 (1989). 
185. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text. 
186. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3). 
187. See H.R. REp. No. 103-835, at 42 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3340, 3350-51; 140 CONGo REc. 27,699 (1994) (statement of Rep. Berman). 
188. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42. 
189. See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 33-37; Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 102. 
190. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)); BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 84. 
191. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42 ("This amendment expressly provides for a 
waiver of sovereign immunity by governmental units with respect to monetary recov­
eries as well as declaratory and injunctive relief."). 
192. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 89; see also Massachusetts v. Morash, 
490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989). 
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The third clause of § 106 provides further clarity of the phrase 
"money recovery" by explicitly precluding punitive damages.193 
The exclusion of punitive damages is an essential element of the 
statute that the In re Rivera Torres court ignores in its analysis.194 
Since the statute consists of a general provision followed by a clari­
fication and an express limitation, it seems the more proper course 
of action would be to find an extension of the limitation rather than 
to find a specific allowance.195 Thus, the first clause allows for equi­
table remedies, such as injunctive or declarative relief, and the third 
clause restricts punitive damages, leaving compensatory damages as 
the only remedy available to be included as a "money recovery." 
Emotional distress damages are compensatory damages, and as 
such, are included in the term "money recovery."196 Emotional dis­
tress damages are awarded to make the plaintiff emotionally whole 
in the same manner as other compensatory damages, such as those 
involving personal injury.197 
Emotional distress is an actual injury. Our emotions can wreak 
havoc with our nervous system, often having physical side effects. 
Emotional distress is not an ethereal proposition or an intangible 
concept. The stress is felt not by the inanimate object, the check 
bouncing or the account freezing. Rather, the emotions belong 
to and are felt by the owner of the bounced check and the frozen 
account.198 
193. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (2000). 
194. See generally Morash, 490 U.S. at 115 (" '[I]n expounding a statute, we are 
not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of 
the whole law, and to its object and policy.'" (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 
481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987»); BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 89 ("[T]he statute is to be 
read as a whole."). 
195. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 82-83 ("The coverage of the statue 
[sic] is the norm and the exception is the unusual, so the presumption is that those 
things not specifically excepted were to follow the norm, i.e., not be excepted."). 
196. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139, 
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32293 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006), affd on reh'g, No. 05-5139, 
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15816 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2007) (holding that emotional distress 
claims are compensatory damages); Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat'! Guard, No. 98-079, 1999 
WL 966951, at *2 (Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep't of Labor Oct. 25, 1999) ("Compensa­
tory damages are designed to compensate discriminatees not only for direct pecuniary 
loss, but also for such harms as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and 
mental anguish and suffering."); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (stat­
ing mental and emotional distress constitute compensable injuries in a § 1983 case). 
197. Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 (holding that mental and emotional distress constitute 
compensable injuries in § 1983 case); Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88-92 (stating that emotional 
distress awards are compensatory under Internal Revenue Code). 
198. Holden v. United States (In re Holden), 226 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. D. Vt. 
1998). 
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The logic, therefore, is very simple: If emotional distress dam­
ages are a compensatory claim, and the "money recovery" language 
expressly authorizes compensatory damages, then the waiver 
should cover the claim for emotional distress.199 
Clarification of the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 106 
can also be found in the manner in which Congress has explicitly 
limited the remedies.20o Congress's limitation on awards of puni­
tive damages establishes intent to exclude "categories" of damages 
and not particular claims.201 Singling out a specific claim for exclu­
sion is inconsistent with the text of the statute.202 Remedies can be 
classified by category and claim.203 Categories broadly define the 
purpose and effect of the remedies available, while claims are nar­
rowly tailored to the precise injury suffered.204 Section 106 does 
not separate remedies by claim, but rather by category, namely, eq­
uitable, compensatory, and punitive.205 
B. Emotional Distress Damages and the Discharge Injunction 
Waiving sovereign immunity for awards of emotional distress 
damages is consistent with the purposes of a discharge injunction. 
Historically speaking, the discharge developed as governments real­
ized that proper bankruptcy administration required that debtors 
be protected from overzealous creditors.206 Indeed, debtors often 
199. Cf Michelle Miller, Comment, The Fox vs. the Hedgehog: Why Purely Emo­
tional Damages Should Be Recoverable Under § 11 u.s.c. 362(h), 4 DEPAUL Bus & 
COMM. L.J. 497 (2006) (applying the same logical formula to the phrase "actual dam­
ages" within 11 U.s.c. § 362(h) (2000». 
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 106. 
201. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 90 (stating that a specific provision 
controls a general provision). 
202. Id. 
203. See DOBBS, supra note 139, at 2 (classifying remedies by category based on 
general purpose); CHARLES MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 1-3 (1935), reprinted in KELLIS E. 
PARKER, MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIES 21-22 (3d ed. 1975) (tying individual claims to 
the specific violation of right). 
204. FISCHER, supra note 140, at 2 ("The coupling of the concepts of wrong and 
remedy helps demonstrate the essential purpose of remedies, which is to redress the 
wrong ...."); MCCORMICK, supra note 203, at 1-3. 
205. 11 U.S.C. § 106; see also Thomas, supra note 152, at 1083 ("Focusing on the 
purpose or goal of the remedy rather than on the superficial form of the relief would 
better preserve remedial rights of plaintiffs and keep the power of courts intact to rem­
edy wrongs."). 
206. McCoid, supra note 59, at 192 ("Seen in historical context, the discharge was 
the ultimate instrument of the transformation of bankruptcy from a creditors' collection 
remedy to a system of statutorily mandated composition mutually beneficial to debtors 
and creditors."); Wasson, supra note 40, at 96 ("An aspect of this shift [from punish­
ment to rehabilitation] was the growing recognition that effective rehabilitation meant 
291 2007] BANKRUPTCY AND EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS 
see the discharge as a principal reason to enter bankruptcy proceed­
ings.207 To protect cooperating debtors, bankruptcy courts rou­
tinely issue actual damage awards against creditors who violate the 
discharge injunction.208 Because the discharge injunction is meant 
to protect the debtor from the same actions that can form the basis 
of an emotional distress claim, such claims are appropriate to fulfill 
the "fresh start" objective of the Bankruptcy Code.209 For govern­
ment creditors to induce debtors to enter bankruptcy with the 
promise of discharge only to hide behind sovereign immunity when 
they attempt to collect on the discharged debts, is counterproduc­
tive to both the "fresh start" policy the discharge injunction is 
meant to support, and to the express language of the § 106 immu­
nity waiver.210 
that debtors could not be hounded continuously to pay discharged debts."); see also 
Miller, supra note 199, at 508-09 ("The Bankruptcy Code, while it may have an overall 
financial aim, was drafted with reference to the emotional incidents of bankruptcy 
...."). 
207. See GARY KLEIN ET AL., SURVIVING DEBT 15 (3d ed. 1999) ("Bankruptcy 
can ... be used to get a creditor to back off of aggressive collection efforts."); 4 COL­
LIER, supra note 57, 'II 524.LH[I] (noting the frequent practice of unscrupulous creditors 
coercing debtors into paying discharged debts); see also McCoid, supra note 59, at 186 
(noting that the discharge is a compromise between allowing the debtor to retain 
enough assets to induce compliance and retaining enough debts to satisfy creditors); 
Wasson, supra note 40, at 103 ("[I]nsupportable debt forced upon debtors by such [co­
ercive] tactics [is] likely to lead them into bankruptcy again or cause them to default on 
their obligations to post-discharge creditors and pre-discharge creditors who have com­
plied with the detailed provisions for a valid reaffirmation agreement."). 
208. In re Meyers, 344 B.R. 61, 66-67 (Bankr. D. Pa. 2006) ("One significant re­
medial purpose of a bankruptcy discharge order is to prevent the emotionally harmful 
conduct associated with debt collection tactics."); In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 357, 370 
(Bankr. D. Ohio 2003) ("[T]his Court has traditionally awarded actual damages ... to a 
debtor injured by a ... violation of the discharge injunction."). 
209. Meyers, 344 B.R. at 67. 
Regardless whether it is appropriate to award damages for emotional distress 
for the violation of a court order in other contexts, in my view, such damages 
should be awarded (when suffered by a debtor) for violation of a bankruptcy 
discharge order. This is because there is a direct nexus between the purpose of 
the discharge order and the emotional distress which may result from the vio­
lation of the order. 
Id. 
210. See S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815 
("[T]he policy [of section 106] is designed to achieve approximately the same result that 
would prevail outside of bankruptcy."); see also Greene, supra note 68, 558 ("Section 
106 was included in the Bankruptcy Code to provide a level playing field for debtors to 
realize their claims against the government in an efficient and practical manner. "). 
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C. Judicial Anxiety Toward Emotional Distress Claims 
The overriding objection to allowing bankruptcy judges to hear 
emotional distress claims is that these claims are too complex and 
too easy to manufacture for bankruptcy judges to adequately assess 
them.211 This criticism is not limited to bankruptcy judges; there 
exists a longstanding judicial anxiety towards emotional distress 
claims. 
The law has always been wary of claims of emotional distress, 
because they are so easy to manufacture. For a long time dam­
ages for such distress were generally limited to cases in which the 
plaintiff was able to prove some other injury .... The courts have 
grown more confident of their ability to sift and value claims of 
emotional distress, and the old limitations have largely been 
abandoned; but suspicion lingers ....212 
There are two reasons for this hesitation. First, there is a gen­
eral distrust in the claims themselves; that is, that an unscrupulous 
plaintiff could easily claim to have suffered an emotional injury.213 
Second, there is the more specific fear that bankruptcy judges, so 
focused on a single area of law, will not be able to properly evaluate 
those claims before them.214 Aside from the anxiety regarding the 
emotional distress claims themselves, some believe emotional dis­
tress claims are beyond the scope of a bankruptcy court's power.215 
211. McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The problems of 
proof, assessment, and appropriate compensation attendant to awarding damages for 
emotional distress are troublesome enough in the ordinary tort case, and should not be 
imported into civil contempt proceedings."). 
212. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation 
omitted). 
213. Id.; McBride, 955 F.2d at 577. 
214. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 879-80 ("[B]ankruptcy judges are not selected with refer­
ence to their likely ability to evaluate claims of emotional injury."). 
215. 	 Ahart, supra note 95, at 50. 
A bankruptcy judge has virtually no implied authority under federal law. 
She should not rely on inherent powers to sanction parties, dismiss a case, 
punish for abuse of process or contempt of court, to deny compensation to 
professionals employed by the estate, or to grant any other relief except per­
haps an order necessary for the court to perform its legitimate function. She 
should rarely, if ever, formulate any new federal common law or imply a pri­
vate right of action under any section of the Code. While she has some statu­
tory equitable powers, she has no non-statutory general equitable authority. 
She should refrain from referring to herself as a "court of equity." A bank­
ruptcy judge should not deny a party to a legal cause of action the right to trial 
by jury simply because the party filed a proof of claim, counterclaim, a bank­
ruptcy petition or the action itself in the bankruptcy court. She ought not 
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None of the previous three concerns are sufficient justification 
for denying emotional distress claims for violation of a discharge 
injunction. Since the cause of action first arose, progress has been 
made in creating a process so that fraudulent claims are found and 
disrnissed.216 The appropriate method of stopping fraudulent 
claims of emotional distress is strictly enforcing the burden of 
proof, not creating a judicially imposed bar.217 The appellate pro­
cess is also available to correct any mistakes that slip through the 
gap.218 
The argument that bankruptcy judges are somehow less quali­
fied to assess emotional distress claims is also an unjustified ratio­
nale for denying such claims. It seems unreasonable to assume that 
bankruptcy judges work in a "bankruptcy vacuum" and are there­
fore only qualified to handle that one area of the law.219 Bank­
ruptcy judges, like all judges, are selected based on their extensive 
educational achievements and practical experience.22o Further­
more, bankruptcy judges are not political appointees, but rather are 
selected based on merit by a majority of judges from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals.221 Finally, while claims of emotional distress 
may be more difficult to demonstrate than physical torts such as 
battery, bankruptcy judges have a preexisting legal standard and 
case law on which to fall back.222 
invoke equitable principles, defenses, doctrines or remedies to make bank­
ruptcy law or vary bankruptcy statutes or bankruptcy rules. 
Id.; see also McBride, 955 F.2d at 577 (holding that civil contempt power is not an 
appropriate vehicle for emotional distress claims). 
216. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880 ("The courts have grown more confident of their 
ability to sift and value claims of emotional distress ...."); see also Stinson v. Bi-Rite 
Rest. Supply, Inc. (In re Stinson), 295 B.R. 109, 128 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is one 
thing to assert emotional distress, but it is quite another thing to persuade a bankruptcy 
judge to find that emotional distress existed."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 128 F. 
App'x 30 (9th Cir. 2005). 
217. Bishop v. U.S. BankIFirstar Bank, N.A. (In re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890, 897 
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003). 
218. Stinson, 295 B.R. at 128 ("While I doubt that bankruptcy judges would ever 
establish a pattern of abusing their authority to award emotional distress damages, I am 
confident that the appellate process would correct abuses."). 
219. Miller, supra note 199, at 510; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer 
R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2004) (stating that expert knowledge is not required to fulfill a lawyer's 
requirement of competent representation). 
220. Miller, supra note 199, at 510 n.103 ("Bankruptcy judges are graduates at the 
top of their class from top tier law schools and active in a wide variety of legal organiza­
tions and publications."). 
221. U.S. Courts, Federal Judiciary Frequently Asked Questions, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited July 20, 2007). 
222. See In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 357, 371 (Bankr. D. Ohio 2003). 
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The contention that emotional distress claims are beyond the 
scope of a bankruptcy court's power is also without merit. Despite 
the initial knee-jerk reaction against hearing tort claims in a bank­
ruptcy court, the bankruptcy courts may only hear such claims if 
they relate to a preexisting bankruptcy claim.223 Section 106 was 
designed to maximize efficiency by allowing a debtor to litigate all 
related claims in one forum.224 Additionally, this argument stands 
against the prevailing view that § 105 grants bankruptcy courts 
broad powers.225 
Although the degree appears to be relatively minor, this hesita­
tion played a role in the Rivera Torres decision. In dicta, the court 
noted that it would assume that the debtors met the standard for 
emotional distress damages "with some skepticism."226 The court 
also cited language from McBride v. Coleman, which exhibits this 
hesitancy as a rationale for disallowing emotional distress c1aims.227 
[W]hen a "willful" violation of the discharge injunction is at issue, damages for 
mental!emotional distress may be awarded, despite the absence of any demon­
strable out-of-pocket losses, if two conditions are met: (1) the debtor clearly 
suffered some appreciable emotional!mental harm; and (2) the actions giving 
rise to the emotional/mental distress were severe in nature. As it concerns the 
former requirement, actual medical testimony is helpful, but not always 
needed. In this regard, the greater the extent of the creditor's violation, the 
less corroborating evidence, including medical testimony, that will be needed 
to establish that the debtor suffered from an appreciable amount of emotional! 
mental distress so as to be compensable. The converse is also true, and thus 
the less severe the creditor's conduct, the more important corroborating evi­
dence will become, particularly medical testimony, to sustain a case for com­
pensatory damages based upon emotional/mental distress. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
223. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(2) (2000); Stinson, 295 B.R. at 128 (applying the same 
logic to emotional distress claims based on a violation of a § 362(h) automatic stay); see 
also 11 U.S.c. § 106(b) (waiving sovereign immunity against counterclaims). 
224. Greene, supra note 68, at 558 ("Rather than prolong the debtor's tortured 
existence in bankruptcy by dragging the debtor through different courts to litigate cer­
tain claims, Congress wanted to make the bankruptcy court a one-stop federal court for 
claims against the sovereign."). 
225. United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545,549 (1990) ("These statutory 
directives are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as 
courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships."); 2 COL­
LIER, supra note 13, 'lI 105.01[2] (noting that the prevailing view sees § 105 as granting 
the bankruptcy courts broad authority to fill statutory gaps in the Bankruptcy Code); 
see also supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (describing § 105's evolution and the 
expanding powers of the bankruptcy courts). 
226. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 23 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005). 
227. Id. at 27 (" 'The problems of proof, assessment, and appropriate compensa­
tion attendant to awarding damages for emotional distress are troublesome enough in 
the ordinary tort case, and should not be imported into civil contempt proceedings.'" 
(quoting McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1992»). 
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Regardless of the degree to which this factor was afforded consider­
ation in determining the outcome of the case, a court's hesitancy or 
disfavor of a particular claim should not affect whether the statu­
tory language extends a waiver of sovereign immunity for that 
claim. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has shown that the In re Rivera Torres court made 
several crucial mistakes in interpreting § 106. A plain reading of 
the language of § 106, coupled with the specific purposes for its en­
actment, demonstrates the congressional intent to waive sovereign 
immunity for awards of compensatory damages. Emotional distress 
damages, which seek to compensate the plaintiff for his or her emo­
tional harm, must be included in this waiver. To single out a spe­
cific claim of compensatory damages is antithetical to the specific 
wording and structure of § 106. Since Congress chose to exclude 
relief on the basis of broad categories, rather than individual claims, 
it is beyond the scope of a bankruptcy court's authority to scrutinize 
the different causes of action within those categories. 
Bankruptcy is an emotionally charged experience for debtors. 
To ease the process, the discharge injunction was developed. Emo­
tional distress damages should not be singled out merely because 
they are controversial or hard to qualify. Any fear that such dam­
ages are subject to fraud can be most appropriately handled by ap­
plying and enforcing a strict burden of proof rather than simply 
precluding their availability to those plaintiffs who, given their fi­
nancial situation, are likely to be emotionally harmed by callus or 
overzealous creditors. 
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In sum, where a debtor can make a legitimate case that a gov­
ernment creditor has emotionally harmed him in the direct course 
of a bankruptcy action, § 106's waiver of sovereign immunity should 
not be used to bar the claim. 
Robert A. McDonald* 
* The author would like to express his most sincere gratitude to Beth 
Chapdelaine, whose constant love and support was critical to the success of this Note. 
The author's Note Editor, Neal Eriksen, also deserves thanks for reading drafts and 
providing comments and criticisms. 
